Wang Jisi is a Professor in the School of International Relations and President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Beijing University.  He was also a member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of China’s Foreign Ministry between 2008 and 2016.  He published an article on the Ai Sixiang website on 8th April 2020 in which he discusses the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on relations between China and the United States.  There is a link to the original article at the end of this post.

I will comment further below on Wang’s article (in both English and Chinese), but I would say at the outset it is both measured and alarming.  Given his background, I have no doubt he has close contacts with and considerable influence over policy makers in China.  It is definitely an important article.

Starting in the Obama era…

Wang begins his article saying there has been a gradual deterioration in the US-China relationship since 2009, starting during the Obama administration.  The deterioration has become much more pronounced since Trump took office, but problems including trade disputes, Hong Kong, Taiwan, human rights, the South China Sea, science and technology decoupling and intellectual property rights have all existed for many years.  Trump has focussed on commercial and trade issues, in line with his aim of making ‘America great again’, but the other problems have not gone away.

Continuing under Trump…

Wang says that Trump, together with the US State and Defence Departments, view China as the main strategic competitor of the US, as well as a ‘revisionist state’ that wants to change the current global order.  The overall policy of the United States is to engage in long-term strategic competition with China.

Trump’s first order of business was to set off a trade war, which reached the end of its first stage with the signing of the Phase One Trade Agreement on 15th January 2020.  China promised to purchase large quantities of American products, and there were also measures relating to financial services, intellectual property rights, forced technology transfer and relaxation of currency controls.  Wang says Trump originally intended to follow this up with a further round of trade talks after the Presidential Election in November of this year.  But the timing of those talks and their likely results have become much less certain as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Wang says that in the early stages of the pandemic the Chinese government had hoped for more cooperation with the United States.  Instead, the anti-Chinese attitude of the US has intensified instead of lessening.  While there are still areas of cooperation, Trump has described Covid-19 as the ‘Chinese virus’ and the United States is ‘spreading rumours to blacken China’s reputation’.  While the overall effect on diplomatic relations is confused, those relations have definitely taken a turn for the worse as a result of the pandemic.

Wang goes on to discuss what is likely to happen next.  He says Trump and the US Congress are likely to continue introducing new policies and measures to keep the pressure on China in relation to the trading and commercial relationship, science and technology competition, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.  He comments further on several of these areas.  It is notable that he says American actions in relation to both Hong Kong and Tibet involve ‘interference in China’s internal affairs’.  He then moves on to other aspects of the relationship between the US and China, including the increased monitoring of Chinese students in the US and the tit for tat steps taken by both the US and China between the middle of February and early March this year to restrict the activities of journalists in each country.

The likely impact of the US Presidential election on the bilateral relationship

Wang discusses in some detail the impact that the US Presidential election in November may have on the China-US relationship.  He asks whether the election of Trump or Biden would be better for China, and replies that each has advantages and disadvantages.  If Trump is re-elected, he and his administration will continue to keep up the pressure on China in relation to trade issues and will likely adopt other policies aimed at containing China’s influence.  The one good point is that Trump has devoted most of his energy to trade and commercial issues during his first term and has given relatively little attention to other issues including the South China Sea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, human rights and Xinjiang.  By contrast, if Biden is elected, his approach to issues impinging on Chinese internal affairs may be more ‘excessive’ than Trump’s.  He may also seek the support of other countries to join with the US in countering the Chinese ‘threat’.  On the other hand Biden has a longer historical connection with China, and a better understanding of it, than Trump.  Wang says that Biden does not believe China is the biggest threat to the United States (but he does not elaborate on the reasons for saying this).  In addition, a number of the people assisting Biden with his campaign were US diplomats during the Obama Presidency and have a much better understanding of China than the people working with Trump.  Wang concludes that, whoever is elected in November, it is not possible to be optimistic about the evolution of US policy towards China over the coming years.

China’s attitude to the United States

Wang next discusses the Chinese attitude to the United States.  He says that over the past two years of trade war and now the pandemic, there has been a pronounced change in the views of the Chinese government, media, think tanks and public opinion towards the US.  Before this happened, the China-US relationship was considered by the Chinese to be their most important international relationship.  This has now been replaced by a view that China needs to oppose the US ‘measure for measure’ and dare to ‘show its sword’.  He says that all kinds of literary and artistic works, videos and articles published in China show they no longer ‘have hope’ in the US.  This has resulted in less public tolerance in China for anti-Chinese statements by Americans.  For example, when Daryl Morey, manager of the Houston Rockets basketball team, posted a critical tweet about Hong Kong in October 2019, the Chinese government temporarily suspended broadcasts of NBA games, which have a huge audience in China.  Wang says such things may well become a ‘pattern’ in the future, as the Chinese become increasingly intolerant of US behaviour in the ‘information war’, ‘public opinion war’ and ‘diplomatic war’ between the two countries.  He says the overall loss of trust and hostility between the two sides has reached a level never before reached during the 41 years since the countries established diplomatic relations in 1979.

Meanwhile, China’s relationship with Russia has improved to the extent that it can be described as a ‘an overall strategic partnership for a new era’.  Mutual trust between the two countries has risen to an unprecedented level.  China is also focussing much more on its relationship with developing countries around the world and is increasing its efforts to work with the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies including the World Health Organisation.  In international bodies in which the US does not play a role, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS organisation of India, China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa, China is now playing a leading role.

Wang goes on to describe his overall judgment of the US-China relationship.  He says that over the past several years, the comparative economic and military positions of the two countries has moved in favour of China.  The internal political situation in each country has also changed.  The American political situation has become more ‘polarised’, with more intense debate between the Republican and Democratic Parties and an upsurge in ‘identity politics’.  China at the same time has put more emphasis on the unified leadership of the Communist Party of China and has taken steps to strengthen the Party’s internal structure and to fight against corruption.  There is a greater emphasis on ideology, and control of the internet has become more strict.  The contradictions between the US and China in terms of their respective social systems, values and national interests have become more and more pronounced.  Wang says the trade war is just a ‘sign’ of the overall deteriorating relationship, it is not the cause of it.  If anything the trade war has temporarily disguised the many conflicts in other areas.

Wang’s predictions about the future evolution of the relationship and how bad it could get

Wang then turns to the future of the bilateral relationship.  He predicts it will become steadily more hostile and tense, with less and less room for manoeuvre, and will move from a state of overall strategic competition to one of overall confrontation.  He says the possibility of the US and China falling into the ‘Thucydides Trap’ cannot be ruled out. [Note: the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, writing about the conflict between Athens and Sparta, said that when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power that can easily lead to war.] 

Wang points out that a state of overall hostility between the US and China would be different from the state of hostility that prevailed between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  There was no economic relationship to speak of, little in the way of cultural and social links, and no scientific and technological cooperation to destroy.  It mainly took the form of an arms race between the two countries.  By contrast, a state of overall hostility between the US and China would involve a complete falling out in all of those areas, with complex and far reaching consequences.  The relationship between the US and the Soviet Union was fraught from the start, whereas China and the US both had high expectations that cooperation between them would be beneficial to both sides.  Wang says both sides have now ‘lost hope’.

Wang nonetheless say there is unlikely to be a complete rupture between the two countries in the near term.  The signing of the Phase I Trade Agreement in January has temporarily lessened trade tensions.  China is still preoccupied with bringing the virus under control, and also with achieving its long-held goal of establishing a ‘moderately prosperous society’ by the end of this year.  [Achieving the goal of a ‘moderately prosperous society’, in which the material needs of most citizens are adequately met, by the end of 2020 is a key policy goal of the Chinese Communist Party and Government.]  The United States also has the virus to contend with, and will soon be in the midst of a Presidential election campaign.  Wang says it is therefore unlikely there will be a sudden worsening of the relationship in the immediate future.  However, he does not rule out the possibility of a further worsening of the relationship in the future, even to the extent of breaking off diplomatic relations between the countries.

Wang concludes his article by saying it will be more difficult because of the pandemic to fully implement the Phase I Trade Agreement.  It will also be hard to reverse the existing trend to economic and technology ‘decoupling’.  Communications between the two sides are likely to become more and more restricted.  Overall, this is the most difficult stage in the relationship between the countries since the early 1970s and it is impossible to predict both how long the deterioration will continue and how far it will go.

Comment:

As I said above, Wang Jisi’s article is both measured and alarming.  Given his academic background and his membership of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee to the Chinese Foreign Ministry between 2008 and 2016, his views on the US-China bilateral relationship deserve to be taken very seriously.  He sets out the Chinese position on the key areas of conflict between the US and China in a very matter of fact way.  It is also likely his views reflect the current thinking of senior members of the Chinese government and the Communist Party of China.  

It is notable that Wang does not comment on how he thinks the relationship between the two countries ‘should’ evolve from this point on.  He focusses on how they got to the stage they are at now and what is likely to happen next.  He does not make judgments about which side is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, but he clearly shows how the two sides have radically different national interests. 

Wang’s comment that China and the US may fall into the ‘Thucydides Trap’, leading to outright war between the countries, is disturbing.  As is his statement that the deterioration of the relationship may lead to the countries breaking off diplomatic relations.  Wang correctly points out this would have huge consequences in terms of the many economic, cultural and social links between the countries.  It should not be forgotten the two countries have enormous financial investments in each other’s economy.  There are also around four million Chinese Americans, though the number of Americans in China is much smaller.

One point on which I am more pessimistic than Wang is his view of the likelihood of the bilateral relationship taking a serious turn for the worse in the near term.  He believes this is unlikely to happen because both countries are preoccupied with fighting the virus, while the US has its election coming up and China is focussed on achieving its goal of a ‘moderately prosperous society’ by the end of this year.  I am not sure he is right on this. That may be in part because I am writing these comments three weeks after Wang published his article and three weeks is a long time in the history of this pandemic.  As Covid-19 continues to wreak havoc in the US and Europe, American criticism of China is becoming more strident by the day, and similar attacks are being made in European countries including the UK and France.  There are reports today (1st May) that Trump is again alleging the virus originated in the Wuhan Laboratory of Virology.  There is talk of the US ‘cancelling’ the $1.1 trillion of US bonds that China holds.  It can be assumed that would lead to all US assets in China being confiscated.  Nobody can know where this is leading.   

评论

我前面提到王缉思这篇文章写得非常谨慎但却振聋发聩的。鉴于他的长期学术经历和作为2008-2016年任中国外交部外交政策咨询委员会委员的地位，他对中美双边关系的看法值得关注。他在本文章上冷静地阐释了中国对中美之间主要矛盾的态度。实际上我认为王教授的看法反映中国政府和中共领导人的目前见解。

值得一提的是，王教授并未评论中美未来应该如何发展关系，而是把注意力集中到两国关系是怎样发展到目前这个局面的，以及未来关系发展的趋势和可能性。他没有评论各方的正误，但他明确指出了两国截然不同的国家利益。

 王教授关于两国陷入“修昔底德陷阱”进而开战的可能性的看法令人担心。正如他所指出的那样，两国关系的恶化会导致中美断交，而断交会在经济文化和社会交往领域造成严重后果。不容忽视的是两国都对对方进行了金融投资，有400万住在美国的美籍华人，华侨和留学生；而住在中国的美籍人口却少得多。

对于王教授关于中美关系不会在近期翻车的预测，我更加悲观。王认为两国由于正在集中精力处理各自的问题 （包括在国内它们都得对抗疫情，美国今年举行的总统大选 和中国今年实现建成小康社会的目标），因而两国突然陷入冲突的可能性很小，对此我不敢苟同。我写这个评论是在王教授发表其文章的三周以后，对于疫情来说，三周是一段很长的时间。疫情继续在全球肆虐的时候，美国对中国的谴责日益加重。欧洲包括英法也发出类似谴责。今天据悉特朗普再度声称新冠肺炎病毒源自于中国科学院武汉病毒研究所。另外美国强硬派主张美国政府应该废除中国所持有的一百亿美元的美国国债。

Link to the original article:  http://www.aisixiang.com/data/120783.html

Michael Ingle (michaelingle01@gmail.com)

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Tags: Covid-19, 王缉思, US China bilateral relationship, Wang Jisi, 新冠肺炎, 中美关系