Xiao Gongqin (萧功秦) was born in 1946 and graduated from Nanjing University. He is a Professor at Shanghai Normal University and has been a visiting professor at a number of western universities. He is well known as an exponent of ‘neo-authoriatian modernisation’ and his main area of research is the history of thought in modern and contemporary China.

I will be summarising an article by Professor Xiao entitled “Looking at the Last Forty Years from the Viewpoint of the Last Two Hundred Years – How the Chinese People Rediscovered Their Cultural Self-Confidence” (“从两百年看四十年：中国人如何重建文化自信”). This article was published on 爱思想 on 15th May 2021 and was developed from a keynote speech that the writer gave at a meeting to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese ‘Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy’. It is a fascinating and succinct outline of the development of the Chinese people’s view of themselves in relation to the rest of the world, from the time of the Opium Wars up to the present: from a conviction that China was the centre of the world and entitled to receive ‘tribute’ from other countries – to a complete loss of confidence in China’s future at the end of the 19th century/beginning of the 20th century – to a resurgence in confidence over the past 40 years. The writer finishes his article with a serious warning to China’s modern day ‘Wolf Warriors’ and their ultra-nationalist supporters. The article contains many facts, particularly in relation to the Boxer Rebellion and its suppression, that I suspect are little known to both Chinese and western readers.

I have set out my own comments on the article, plus a website link to the original article, at the end of this post.

Please note that all translations from the original article (and any errors they may contain) are mine.

Summary of article

The author begins his article with a clear warning about the importance of historical understanding and historical truth. He says: “It is only true history that can provide true wisdom based on experience. A nation can only achieve such wisdom from a true understanding of its history.”

The author goes on to describe how the development of China’s unique culture over a period of millennia in virtual isolation from other world cultures engendered strong feelings of cultural superiority among the Chinese people and their rulers. He notes that the Chinese who lived in the time of the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties (roughly 2100 BC to 221 BC) had no knowledge of the Ancient Greek, Roman, Babylonian and Egyptian cultures that rose and fell around the Mediterranean Sea during the same period.

The sense of cultural superiority on the part of the ancient Chinese gave rise to the concept of the ‘all under heaven order’ (tianxia zhixu’/’天下秩序’). This was an order in which China occupied the central (and top) position in a graded world order. Other peoples were regarded as ‘manyi’ (‘蛮夷’/a term describing non-Han peoples that was not exclusively derogatory but is sometimes translated as ‘barbarians’). These peoples were expected to send representatives to provide ‘tribute’ to the Chinese Emperor, to show their respect as humble non-Han people for the Chinese. The Chinese Emperor in turn reciprocated by providing their representatives with valuable gifts.

Professor Xiao points out that for two thousand years from the start of the Qin/Han period (in 221 BC), the Chinese had no experience of the ‘international system’ that developed in Europe. This system was based on independent countries of similar status existing side by side. The author says that if you asked an Emperor of the Ming Dynasty to name the ‘country’ of which he was the sovereign, he would have been unable to understand the question, and may well have replied: “I am the sovereign of all under heaven, what do you mean by asking me what country I am the sovereign of?”

The author then discusses how these concepts of cultural superiority and the ‘all under heaven order’ affected China’s dealings with foreign countries. He describes how the British twice sent diplomatic missions to China between 1793 and 1816. They wanted China to agree to expand commercial relations with Britain. However, when the envoys arrived in Beijing to meet the Qianlong and Jiaqing Emperors on their respective visits, they refused to comply with the formal rules of etiquette required when meeting the Emperor, i.e., kneeling three times and kowtowing nine times. They were only prepared to comply with the rules that applied when meeting the English Monarch, i.e., doffing their hats and bowing. This angered the Qianlong and Jiaqing Emperors, who both expelled the envoys. The author quotes the Qianlong Emperor who said: “The Heavenly Empire has everything, we have no need to trade with foreign countries”. The author points out that such views were not exclusive to Chinese Emperors, they were also shared by the Chinese elites (‘shidafu’/士大夫’) and the ordinary people (‘baixing’/’百姓’).

The author states that these attitudes were slow to change even after the Chinese were defeated in the First Opium War (1839-1842). He refers to the “Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms” (‘海国图志’) by the scholar-official Wei Yuan, which was first published in 1843 and was the first large scale Chinese language text describing western nations and culture. The author says only 3,000 copies were sold in China during the first 30 years after publication. By contrast, when it was later translated into Japanese and published in Japan, it sold 300,000 copies in one year. This was at a time when China’s population was seven times as large as Japan’s.

Professor Xiao concludes the first part of his essay by saying that the feelings of cultural superiority and cultural self-confidence arising from China’s ‘closed off state’ (‘封闭状态’), meant that all levels of Chinese society seriously lacked knowledge of the outside world. This in turn led to cultural and strategic misjudgments, with disastrous results including China’s successive defeats in the two Opium Wars.

Second Opium War – ‘Tongzhou Hostage Incident’

The author then turns his attention to the ‘cultural clash’ between China and the west reflected in the ‘Tongzhou Hostage Incident’ (‘通州人质事件’) and the burning of the Old Summer Palace in 1860. The author says the Tongzhou Hostage incident is little known to people in China today, and I suspect that is also the case in western countries (I at least was not previously aware of it). In the autumn of 1860, during the second Opium War, the joint British and French forces interrupted their march between Tianjin and Beijing at Tongzhou outside Beijing, so that they could enter into peace talks with the Xianfeng Emperor’s representative. They had more or less agreed the terms of the Treaty of Tianjin when the British representative Sir Harry Parkes demanded that, in conjunction with the signing of the Treaty, the British Commander James Bruce, 8th Earl of Elgin, should have an audience with the Emperor in accordance with the rules of international etiquette, and that he should also be accompanied by a 1,000 man Guard of Honour wearing scarlet ceremonial uniforms. The British also refused to observe the Chinese kneeling and kowtowing etiquette. The writer asks why the British made these demands. He says their purpose was to use the European ‘Westphalian System’ of international relations to challenge the Chinese ‘All Under Heaven’ system, and in addition to impress upon the ordinary Chinese population the fact that the ‘magnificent states of Europe’ (‘堂堂欧洲大邦’) were in no sense the ‘barbarians’ that the Chinese believed them to be.

The Xianfeng Emperor regarded the British demands as an intolerable affront. The author says the Emperor genuinely believed the British and French wanted to re-enact the ‘Hongmen Feast’ of 206 BC, when the future Han Emperor Liu Bang escaped attempted murder by his rival Xiang Yu. The 29 year old Xianfeng Emperor severely criticised his representative in the negotiations (Prince Yi) for being taken in by the British and ordered him to arrest the entire group of British and French representatives plus their guards (39 men in all), to be held as hostages.

The Earl of Elgin in response said that if the hostages were not released within three days, he would attack Beijing and burn the entire city to the ground. The Emperor relented and agreed to release the hostages but then changed his mind and ordered that they should all be killed. To prevent the destruction of Beijing, this order was ignored by Prince Gong (a senior statesman of the Qing Dynasty and later regent), who released the living hostages, plus coffins containing the remains of those who had died in custody, to the British and French forces. The writer describes the fate of the hostages: two were beheaded and their heads exhibited to the public; 18 died during their month in custody; the 19 hostages who were still living at the time of their release suffered cruel treatment during their imprisonment, the wounds of some were filled with maggots and others suffered life-long mental illness. The author cites as his sources for these facts the following books: “Modern Chinese Diplomatic History Materials Abstracts” by the well-known Chinese historian Jiang Tingfu and “China War 1860: Letters and Journals” by George Allgood (containing the recollections of Sir Harry Parkes and the Earl of Elgin).

The joint British and French forces then decided to exact revenge by burning one of the Forbidden City or the Old Summer Palace, in order to punish the Xianfeng Emperor by destroying one of his own homes. Professor Xiao says the Earl of Elgin finally decided to destroy the Old Summer Palace instead of the Forbidden City, because he understood that Prince Gong was living in the Forbidden City and would be needed to represent the Emperor in future negotiations. The author wryly comments that the continued existence of the Forbidden City is due to this calculation on the part of the Earl of Elgin.

The author adds that the French opposed the decision to burn the Old Summer Palace and did not participate in setting it to the torch. I had always understood both English and French forces were involved in this. I also saw signs outside buildings in the Summer Palace in Beijing on my own visit there a few years ago, that refer to burning by ‘Anglo-French Allied Forces’, e.g., outside the Hall of Happiness and Longevity (‘乐寿堂’). I have not pursued that issue further for the purposes of this summary.

The author explains that because the Xianfeng Emperor was steeped in the Chinese concept of China’s central position in the world and totally ignorant of the outside world and western ideas of international relations, he regarded ‘foreigners who rebelled against the Emperor’ (‘犯上作乱的夷狄’) as ‘uncivilised bandits’ (‘不开化的土匪’) whom he could punish in an arbitrary way, including death by public decapitation. The author says the great majority of Chinese people are aware of the burning of the Old Summer Palace by the Anglo-French forces, but they are not aware of how the Emperor’s mistaken judgement that he was about to fall victim to a ‘Hongmen Feast’ style assassination plot and his decision to publicly decapitate some of the hostages were among the actual causes of the disaster. The author draws the following conclusion from this: “It is only true history that can provide true lessons”.

Professor Xiao also criticises the British and the French for failing to realise the impact of their demand that a 1,000 man force be allowed to enter Beijing on the ‘psychological tolerance’ of an Emperor of a country that had been largely cut off from the rest of the world for a very long period of time and had its own particular cultural conditions.

Bringing the lessons of Chinese culture to the rest of the world

In the next part of his essay, the author discusses how not just the Emperors but the Chinese elites as well misunderstood China’s position in the world. After China lost a series of wars and had to sign a number of ‘unjust treaties’ (the Treaty of Nanjing in 1942, the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 and the Convention of Peking in 1860), the Chinese elites could no longer ignore the fact that foreign powers were repeatedly attacking and humiliating the country. This led to a theory circulating among these groups that the author describes as ‘bringing the lessons of Chinese culture to the whole world’ (‘泛教化论’). The idea was that China did not need to change, but the rest of the world did. It was thought that the reason foreign powers came to China with their ships and guns was because ‘Heaven’ took pity on their uncivilised state and allowed them to invent ships, machinery, mathematics and astronomy, so that they could travel the great distance to China to absorb the lessons of Chinese culture. If they could only learn about Chinese culture, then within 100 years the rest of the world would accept its position in a ‘world under heaven’ with China at its centre. The author says this idea was taken up even by the ‘great masters of Chinese thought’ and the august members of the Hanlin Imperial Academy including the prominent Qing scholar and official Yu Yue. The author refers readers who wish to know more about this idea to his book “The Predicament of Confucian Culture” (‘儒家文化困境’).

Professor Xiao asks how the most knowledgeable people in China could subscribe to such an idea, and draws on the field of Social Psychology to explain it. He says that when people can see no way to give up a deep rooted world view, and also cannot understand why their present circumstances are harsh and cruel, they can use distorted thinking to imagine reasons for their predicament. A belief in these reasons then allow them to protect their deeply held views and achieve psychological consolation and equilibrium. Seen from this viewpoint, the idea of the Chinese bringing enlightenment to the rest of the world could be seen as a type of psychological defence mechanism.

The author then briefly comments on the 1900 Boxer Rebellion and the occupation of Beijing by the Eight Power Allied Forces. The Qing Court had no alternative but to agree to pay very large amounts of compensation over 39 years to secure the withdrawal of the allied forces. The author says the Chinese people’s feelings of humiliation at that point reached their ultimate limit.

‘Mass feeling of cultural inferiority’ following the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion

The author next discusses how the Chinese people’s feelings of cultural superiority were transformed into what he calls a ‘mass feeling of cultural inferiority’ (‘群体性的文化自卑’).

After the disastrous outcome of the Boxer Rebellion, the Qing Court had no choice but to embark on governance reform and a process of constitutional reform. The author notes how they seriously miscalculated in relation to the latter. The Empress Dowager Cixi asked one of her senior ministers Zhang Zhidong whether China should adopt a western style constitution. The author quotes him as replying: “The faster we adopt a constitution the better. There is no need even to visit foreign countries to investigate, as that would only yield a cursory understanding of the constitutional process. China should simply adopt a good system from the west and apply it in China. What need is there to investigate further?”

Professor Xiao points out that western constitutional systems developed over hundreds of years. They were based on deep rooted practical experience and supported by complex social and cultural conditions. Despite this, Zhang Zhidong took the view that anything from the west could be applied anywhere else in the world; just apply it and it would work.

The writer quotes another Chinese civil servant, Yu Shimei (1853-1916), who said after returning from an inspection trip to Germany that, given China’s particular circumstances, it needed at least 20 years of preparation to put in place an effective constitutional system. The author says he was roundly condemned for this by Chinese public opinion.

The author next describes how the Chinese people’s feelings of inferiority were transformed into a type of ‘cultural self-torment’ (‘文化自虐’). This was evidenced during the New Culture Movement that started in 1915, when prominent figures like Chen Duxiu (later one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party) said that China’s moral principles, laws, academic learning and social customs were without exception leftovers from the traditional feudal system. The Chinese academic Qian Xuantong said the Chinese should reject Confucianism and Taoism, and he also recommended the abolition of Chinese characters. Professor Xiao says these views amounted to a comprehensive attack on China’s traditional culture by radical intellectuals of a type that had never before occurred in history (interestingly the author does not restrict this to Chinese history). The author says this trend continued up to the time of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 70s, manifesting as a “mass fanatical movement to entirely overthrow traditional culture through the irrational ‘Destroy the Four Olds’ campaign” (the ‘Four Olds’ were old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits).

The re-emergence of cultural self confidence after 1978

Professor Xiao next describes how the Chinese regained their cultural confidence starting in 1978. He says that under the leadership of the Communist Party they grasped the historical opportunity of globalised development and adopted a new national policy of openness to the outside world. This enabled the Chinese people to share the benefits of the global division of labour and interaction between different cultures. The author notes that before 1978 the daily wages of two labourers in Guizhou Province were less than the value of a single chicken’s egg. In the suburbs of Beijing a production brigade was dubbed the ‘popsicle brigade’ because the value of a brigade worker’s daily wage was less than the cost of a popsicle. Meanwhile, per capita GDP in China has risen from US$300 in 1978 to US$10,000 in recent years (Professor Xiao’s figures).

The policies of reform and openness implemented since 1978, together with the resulting massive increase in prosperity, have enabled Chinese people to again find true cultural self-confidence. The author concludes this part of his essay by saying that a nation that rejects cultural exchange with the rest of the world cannot possess genuine cultural self-confidence. A nation can only maintain cultural self-confidence “on the basis of mutual learning from other cultures and modernisation”.

‘Cultural atavism’ in contemporary Chinese society

The final part of Professor Xiao’s essay contains a strong warning that the Chinese should not jeopardise their new found cultural self-confidence by indulging in what he describes as ‘cultural atavism’.

The author notes that ‘progress’ (‘进步’) in values and modes of thought is a relatively slow process. Cultural values that have developed over a period of many centuries have a powerful historical inertia. After accumulating over a long period in a people’s unconscious mind they may come to the fore again when the nation again becomes strong.

The author cites a recent example of this. In 2017 a PhD Tutor in Hunan Province published a book entitled “Cultural Origins and an Ideal World” (“文明源头与大同世界”). [It appears this book has not been translated into English, the title translation is mine]. The author does not name the author of this book, but the Baidu Baike entry on the book says the writer is Du Gangjian (‘杜钢建’).]. According to Professor Xiao, the author of the book asserts that based on his research the Ancient Sumerian, Egyptian, Greek and Roman Civilisations were all created by migrants from China. He says in addition that the German, French, British, Japanese, Korean and South-East Asian peoples can all trace their origins to China.

Professor Xiao describes the content of this book as ‘unfounded boastful talk’ (‘虚妄大话’), which is inconsistent with the facts of history, and says he is surprised it could be published in the first place, let alone receive praise from a receptive audience including one reader who commented that “views of this kind can increase the Chinese people’s cultural self-confidence”.

Professor Xiao also refers to the books “China Can Say No” and “Unhappy China” published in 1996 and 2009 respectively. He says these books, in advocating that China should play a much bigger role in managing the world’s resources and the global economy, typify a type of ‘lofty nationalist tide of thought’ (‘高调民族主义思潮’). He compares people who hold these views to a 16 year old child who has just developed some muscles and decides to test his strength in the small town where he lives. In such a child’s mind the desire to impress his peers is much more powerful than considerations of where his true interests lie.

Beware the combination of a cultural mentality based on false pride, plus extreme left thinking and extreme nationalism

The author says he is concerned not just about cultural false pride and nationalism, but also about the danger of extreme left thinking from the Cultural Revolution era reviving in China. While such thinking was severely criticised during the 40 years after the ‘reform and opening’ policies were adopted in 1978, the author is concerned that its ‘deep level factors, including modes of thought and values’, may be ‘dead but rigor mortis has not yet set in’ (‘死而不僵’) and could at any time ‘tenaciously re-emerge’ (‘顽强地表现出来’).

At this point the author introduces an example from the recent wave of Covid deaths in India. He says that at a time when millions of Indians were infected with the virus and tens of thousands of families were losing family members, some people in China took pleasure in this disastrous situation by juxtaposing photos of Indian cremation fires with photos of the flames from a Chinese rocket launching into space. The author says this was widely condemned by public opinion in China. However, a Professor and ‘internet celebrity’ at Fudan University was nonetheless reported as saying that the people who criticised those posting the juxtaposed photos were ‘hypocritical sanctimonious bitches’ (‘虚情假义的圣母婊’).

The author asks why views like those of the Fudan University Professor can attract support from many people. He suggests it is due to the latent influence of extreme left thinking; it is not a big step, he says, to move from the ‘class theory’ of extreme left thinking to a position of extreme nationalism. That is because the two have one thing in common: they are both controlled at the moral level by a conviction of ‘self superiority’. People who indulge in such thinking do not regard other people as fellow human beings, so they can ‘arbitrarily roll over then’ (‘任意碾压’). The author says there is only a single step from the Red Guards’ view during the Cultural Revolution that you could ‘kill class enemies on the spot without determining guilt’ (‘对阶级敌人的格杀勿论’), to the internet Wolf Warriors’ view that ‘even if they are far away you must kill them’ (‘虽远必诛’). The author says it is because the values and modes of thinking of the Red Guards’ ‘Rebel Faction’ and the Wolf Warriors (including some academics) are so similar that ‘cold blooded extreme nationalists’ (‘冷血的极端民族主义者’) have emerged in such large numbers in modern China.

The author goes on to explore the reasons for the emergence of the modern Wolf Warrior syndrome. He says that the ‘older generation’ of Chinese people, after experiencing 10 years of political upheaval during the Cultural Revolution, developed a sort of ‘post-disaster human enlightenment’ (‘灾难后的人性启蒙’). However, the younger generation of Chinese academics lack that ‘enlightenment’, and in addition have not received a ‘humanistic education’. The author laments that during a populist era like the present, it is easy for ‘internet heroes’ to become famous. In seeking pleasure and fame for themselves, they ignore the long term interests of the nation.

The author points out that the threat of extreme nationalism is magnified in a ‘networked world’. The internet and social media repeatedly validate the views of ‘internet heroes’ and convince them that they are supported by all ‘righteous people’. Living in an ‘information cocoon’ (‘信息茧房’) as they do, they imagine that they have discovered the ‘truth of the universe’. The author worries that populism in the internet age can have far graver consequences than the ‘public square populism’ of the past, pushing common sense and rational thinking far away to the margins of society.

The author next refers to the experience and lessons that can be derived from Germany and Japan. He says that when a large country with pride in its history experiences a historical humiliation but subsequently becomes powerful again in a short period of time, that country may well be unable to control its relationship with the outside world. [The author does not elaborate further on this point in his article. However, while I can see the relevance of his point to Germany during the 1930s, I am not sure how it fits with Japan’s history]. He also raises the United States as an example, referring to the use of a small bottle of white power by Colin Powell during a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in February 2003 as ‘evidence’ of Sadam Hussein’s possession of ‘weapons of mass destruction’. Professor Xiao says this helped the US government to secure the ‘overwhelming support’ of American public opinion for the Iraq War. He says this demonstrates how ‘irrational emotions’ can at any time and in any country have massive influence over historical decisions.

Drawing lessons from the pre-Qin period of Chinese history

Professor Xiao concludes his article with a reference to what he describes as the ‘international like order’ of the Spring and Autumn/Warring States period of Chinese history (771 to 221 BC). The Chinese people of that period had not yet been influenced by the ‘all under heaven system’ that prevailed from the beginning of the Qin to the end of the Qing dynasties (i.e., from 221 BC to 1912). People of the pre-Qin period could more clearly understand their ‘objective situation’ (‘客观处境’) in an environment of many states existing together and competing against each other. The writer raises by way of example the famous advice given by a King of the State of Zhongshan (414/381 to 296 BC) shortly before his death to his son: “Do not act recklessly because your state is large; do not raise a hue and cry because your population is large; do not act with arrogance because your state is wealthy” (“毋大而肆，毋众而嚣，毋富而骄“).

The author says the King of Zhongshan’s advice to his son could, if followed by the Chinese people today, add to their ‘collective experience’ in their dealings with the outside world, helping them to avoid the perils of nationalism: bombastic language, vehemence, over-excitement and false pride.

The author goes on to say that a people with genuine cultural self-confidence should have the qualities of ‘generosity’, ‘calmness’ and ‘rational self-restraint’. He says the Chinese of today have sufficient power to protect their own interests, together with the ‘magnanimity’ and ‘breadth of mind’ to meet any challenge they come up against in the course of globalisation. They should not be misled by the perils of nationalism.

The concluding sentence of the article merits quoting in full: “If we cannot draw the lessons of history, we are destined to repeat the errors of history. Our nation will have a glorious future only if our people work with the people of every other country in the world to establish an international community of shared destiny for mankind.”

My comments on the article

I was struck by a few points in relation to the content of the article:

• Professor Xiao refers to the Cultural Revolution period several times, but he does not use the normal Chinese term ‘wenhua da geming’ (‘文化大革命’), which means ‘cultural great revolution’ in English. Instead, he uses the term ‘shi nian dongdang’ (‘十年动荡’), which roughly means ‘ten years of turmoil’. I am not sure why this is, but he may have wanted to avoid confusion with the theme of ‘cultural’ renewal which is the core of his article.
• Professor Xiao’s statement that it is only a small step from the Red Guards’ extreme class based thinking to the extreme nationalism of the ‘Wolf Warriors’ and their supporters also surprised me. I had not previously connected the two, but Professor Xiao clearly sees a direct line of development between them.
• There is a strong emphasis in the article on continuity between the past and the present, hence the title asking us to view the last 40 years in the light of the last 200. Professor Xiao is by no means suggesting that the present is the same as the past, but he strongly believes we can only understand the present in the light of the past.

Professor Xiao’s review of the fall and rise of Chinese cultural self confidence is supported by a large array of factual examples, including telling quotes from famous historical figures and in particular his description of the 1860 ‘Tongzhou Hostage Incident’. He is even handed in his description of the miscalculations made by both Chinese Emperors and western envoys who sought to open China to trade with the west and ended by imposing the ‘unequal treaties’ that were followed by the collapse of the Qing Empire. He is clearly confident that after more than 40 years of ‘reform and opening up’, China now has the strength to become ever more prosperous and defend its status as a leading country in world. But he is also very concerned that ultra-nationalists in China may now jeopardise this success.

Professor Xiao lays great emphasis on the need to understand the lessons of history. In that context, it does seem to me that the many people in the west who assume that China could adopt virtually overnight a western style democratic system are making the same mistake as the senior Qing adviser mentioned in the article who told the Empress Dowager Cixi that it would be very straightforward for China to adopt a western constitutional system. Attempts to do so during the late Qing period and the early Republican period that followed all came to naught. That is not to say it will never happen, but it will certainly take a lengthy period of time.

The article appears to be aimed squarely at a domestic Chinese audience, especially the extreme nationalists supporting the country’s internet ‘Wolf Warriors’. I suspect Professor Xiao did not expect it to be read by many people outside China.

Link to the original article: https://www.aisixiang.com/data/126492.html

Michael Ingle – michaelingle01@gmail.com

Categories: Uncategorized

Tags: Boxer Rebellion, Chinese self confidence, 萧功秦, Tongzhou Hostage Incident, Wolf Warriors