Zhou Li’s article entitled ‘The Main Contradictions in Today’s World and the Changing International Situation’ (‘当前世界主要矛盾与国际格局演变’) was published on the Aisixaing website last Saturday 5th March. It was first published in the China CITIC Group’s ‘Economic Herald’, but I have not been able to identify the date of first publication. I can only assume that it was first published before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as the article contains numerous references to the relationship between China and Russia, without mentioning Ukraine.

Zhou Li (周力) was trained as an economist and is the former Deputy Head of the External Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He is also a former Chinese Ambassador to Ukraine and Kazakhstan. He is 66 years old.

Zhou’s article is interesting not so much for its content about ‘the main contradictions in today’s world’, but rather in terms of what he has to say concerning the relationship between China and Russia, and also between China and Europe. It appears to me that some of this is relevant to the current war in Ukraine. I set out my own comments on the article after the summary below.

Summary of article:

Zhou begins by outlining what he considers to be the ‘main contradictions in today’s world’. He applies the principles of ‘materialist dialectics’ to his analysis of these contradictions. He identifies the main contradictions as follows:

1. Contradictions between the United States and western development countries on the one hand and developing countries on the other hand.

2. Contradictions between the developed capitalist countries themselves, including those between the US and Europe.

3. Contradictions between the US and other western developed countries on the one hand and socialist countries (in particular China) on the other hand.

4. Contradictions at a global level between workers and capitalists.

Zhou says that these contradictions are combining to push forward change at the global level, even to the extent of changing the global order itself. Underlying all of the contradictions and the global changes they are bringing about are the tireless efforts of the ‘global monopolist capitalist class’ to increase the value of its capital. This is realised through the development and extraction of natural resources, production and trade in staple commodities, scientific and technological innovation, the development and application of artificial intelligence, all the while making full use of financial capital, share markets and loose monetary policies including ‘the unlimited printing of money and money laundering’. All of this in turn feeds through into the various contradictions Zhou has identified and the global changes they are bringing about.

Zhou next goes on to discuss the continuing efforts of the US and other developed countries to dominate the rest of the world. He says that even though the contradictions between the US and developed countries continue to increase, they nonetheless together occupy a position of ‘absolute superiority’ in relation to the rest of the world. Zhou says that developing counties still lack ‘discourse power’ and their ability to resist unfairness and injustice on the world stage is ‘extremely weak’.

This situation is changing, however, in Zhou’s view. China has become the second largest economic power in the world and wants to work with ‘each country in the world’, in accordance with the principles of ‘shared commerce, shared development and shared benefits’, to pursue its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ and create a ‘shared human destiny’ for mankind. Multilateral groups of countries including the G20, the BRICS Group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Arab League, the African Union and MERCOSUR are on the rise. Many countries are pursuing ‘local currency settlement arrangements’ and attempting to establish a new international settlement regime independent of the SWIFT system. Zhou says these developments are bringing about a degree of change in the world situation that has not been seen in 100 years. A striking characteristic of this is the ‘rise of the East and the decline of the West’.

Zhou goes on to discuss five key manifestations of global change:

1. The redrawing of the global economic map. Zhou comments on the increasing share of ‘new market economy countries’ and developing countries in the global economy, being responsible for a full 80% of the increase in the size of the global economy over the past 20 years.

2. The transfer of the world’s economic centre from the US and Europe to Asia. Zhou notes that in 2020 Asian countries accounted for 38% of the value of total global production, while 227 of the 500 largest companies in the world were based in Asia.

3. Increasingly serious ‘contradictions’ within the developed western countries. Zhou refers to increasing political and social divisions, the increasing chasm between the rich and poor, loss of trust in governments, institutional decay and loss of hope in the future.

4. The broad mass of developing countries are seeking a greater democratisation of international life through all manner of international bodies, including the reform of the United Nations and the strengthening of their ‘discourse power’.

5. China and Russia have leapt up a level from being important forces for maintaining global peaceful stability to being a ‘firm rock in midstream’. Zhou says the ‘China Russia combination’ has become a ‘model for new international relationships’.

The Development of a Multipolar World Order

Zhou next moves on to what I regard as the core of his essay, discussing the development of a multipolar world order. He mentions three possibilities: a bilateral global order based on the US and China; a trilateral global order based on the US, China and Russia; a truly multilateral global order in which all countries have a say.

Zhou rejects the possibility of a bilateral global order based on the US and China. His reasons for doing so are interesting indeed. He says that a bilateral order of this kind would effectively replace the Soviet Union of the Cold War era with China. He says this would entail serious risks because China is not the natural inheritor of the Soviet Union’s role as one of two superpowers. He says the Soviet Union in its late period pursued a policy of ‘hegemonic behaviour’ and sought to extend the ambit of its ‘sphere of influence’, maintaining military bases around the world. Zhou says that China has never been a hegemonic power and has always sought to follow the road of peaceful development, not interfering in the internal politics of other countries, not violating the territorial integrity of other countries and not forcing its will onto other countries. Zhou says that all countries around the world have fresh memories of the Soviet Union’s attempts to expand its influence and have no desire for China to replace the Soviet Union. He says any talk of this ‘blackens China’s name’. [I comment further on this part of Zhou’s essay below, as his description of the Soviet Union’s behaviour seems also to be an exact description of Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine at the present time.]

Zhou goes on to reject the possibility of a trilateral world order based on the US, Russia and China. He says this would deny the true multilateralism of the world and the globalisation of the world economy. He says that a multilateral world order is the most important basis of the ‘shared destiny for mankind’ that China wishes to foster. Pursuing a bilateral or trilateral world order would be a serious strategic misjudgment that would have ‘grave results’.

Zhou finishes his essay with five recommendations for the future:

1. Seriously manage the ‘protracted war’ between the US and China. [I suspect that Zhou here is referring to a ‘protracted struggle’ rather than ‘war’, but he does use the Chinese character for ‘war’]. Zhou says the ‘decline and growth’ of the Chinese and US power is a ‘long-term historical process’. He further states: “We have to see and also firmly believe that, however the US sanctions or pressures China, it cannot prevent us [China] from moving forward and it cannot prevent the US from falling further behind. We have to grasp the concept that time and circumstances are on our [China’s] side.”

2. Further develop commercial and trading relationships with neighbouring countries, making full use of the opportunities provided by international country groups. While pursuing the ‘One Belt One Road Initiative’ on a global basis, prioritise the benefits for neighbouring countries and work to incorporate them in production and supply chains that use local currencies for settlement purposes.

3. Build up the broadest possible ‘united front’ to resist international hegemonism. Zhou says that China and Russia, as the countries that have the ‘greatest power’ in the world, and also the ‘greatest ability to rally support from other countries’, must strengthen their ‘back to back strategic cooperation’ and expand their ‘strategic room for manoeuvre’. They should work together to resist attempts by the US and its western allies to constrain them. They should also fully develop ‘multilateral cooperation’ with European countries and support European efforts to achieve strategic independence’.

4. Strengthen the status of developing countries. Zhou says that China must work with developing countries in confronting the increasing number of problems they face, and also help such countries to benefit from China’s massive development.

5. Build an effective international arena. Zhou says the existing multilateral system has been unable to change the ‘existing reality’ over a long period of time. China must make full use of its status as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council to strengthen the effectiveness of multilateral institutions. It must also use political, diplomatic, military, economic, scientific/technical and legal resources and methods to ‘analyse’, ‘bring into play’ and ‘transform’ the contradictions discussed above, with the ultimate aim of resolving the key global problems.

My Comments

1. Given Zhou Li’s former role as a Chinese diplomat (including Ambassador to Ukraine), and also as a senior official of the Chinese Communist Party, I think we can assume he has many contacts in the Party and also some ongoing influence within it.

2. I would not say there is anything original in Zhou’s comments on the ‘contradictions’ facing the world and the global changes they are bringing about. There is a certain frisson for a western reader in reading an analysis based on ‘materialist dialectics’. If that is the correct way of describing the methodology Zhou has adopted, then I would say we are all materialist dialecticians when we write about conflicts at a global or even national level. There are nonetheless some particular points in this essay I think we should note.

3. Zhou makes several references to ‘the global monopolist capitalist class’. The way he puts it is rather ironic, as it is clear that many people in China, a supposedly ‘communist’ country, also belong to this class. He does not admit this, but it must be the case.

4. Zhou makes many references to ‘developing countries’. He clearly assumes that China is still a member of this group. I am not an expert in the criteria for deciding whether countries are ‘developing’ or ‘developed’, but it seems increasingly outdated to regard China as falling within the ‘developing country’ group.

5. Zhou’s most interesting comments relate to Russia and China’s relationship with with it. Among other things he refers to the two countries’ ‘back to back strategic cooperation’. This seems a rather defensive way of describing a relationship between countries; why does he not use the term ‘shoulder to shoulder’? He also refers to China and Russia having the ‘greatest power’ in the world, and the greatest ‘ability to rally support from other countries’. I simply cannot understand how he can ignore the United States in this context.

6. Zhou’s description of the Soviet Union’s ‘hegemonic behaviour’ is also a key point in my view. He rejects the idea of a new bilateral world order based on the US and China, because that would involve replacing the Soviet Union with China. He says that would be wrong because China does not behave as a hegemonic power and refuses to interfere in other countries’ internal politics, etc. In reality, though, the Soviet Union ceased to exist over 30 years ago. Why then is there not a possibility of China (as a state very different from the Soviet Union in its latter period) fitting into a new bilateral world order with the US? It occurs to me, however, that Zhou makes these very critical comments about the Soviet Union because he sees similar behaviour going on in Putin’s Russia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is clearly inconsistent with China’s determination not to interfere in other states’ internal politics and not to violate their territorial integrity. Could Zhou’s comments be an indirect message to Putin that China’s support for Russia as a ‘back to back strategic partner’ is not open-ended.

7. There must be a major debate going on right now at the top levels of the Chinese government and the CPC about how to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s actions are clearly an affront to key aspects of China’s diplomatic and strategic policy. It would, however, be unrealistic to expect China completely and immediately to abandon its policy of ‘strategic cooperation’ with Russia. The Chinese very likely believe that, if they were to do that and it led to Russia retreating from Ukraine in abject failure, then the US and other western countries would be happy to renew their focus on China’s own alleged failings in relation to Taiwan, Xinjiang, unfair trade practices, etc. etc. Meanwhile, China is not involved as a direct party to the war. We can only assume that the debate in the Chinese government and the CPC will continue for some time.

Michael Ingle – michaelingle01@gmail.com

Link to the original article on 爱思想： https://m.aisixiang.com/data/131847.html

Categories: Uncategorized